Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-021-00768-0

ORIGINAL EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Does your skin color matter in buyer–seller negotiations? The implications of being a Black salesperson

David Gligor[1] · Christopher Newman[2] · Saim Kashmiri[3]

Received: 13 January 2020 / Accepted: 5 January 2021
© Academy of Marketing Science 2021

Abstract

Despite the evidence in other domains that Black individuals can experience discriminatory treatment, marketing research offers few insights into how Black salespersons (as compared to White salespersons) are perceived and treated within buyer–seller negotiations. We address this limitation in the literature by conducting three studies. First, our findings show that White buyers with a higher social dominance orientation expect Black salespersons to bargain (i.e., negotiate) less than White salespersons. Second, White buyers with a higher social dominance orientation perceive Black salespersons to have bargained more than White counterparts (who have bargained the same). Third, when negotiating with White buyers with a higher social dominance orientation, Black salespersons receive lower product prices than White salespersons. Fourth, when negotiating with White buyers with a higher social dominance orientation, Black salespersons are less likely to be referred to other prospective buyers than White salespersons. Interestingly, no differences exist for White buyers lower on social dominance orientation. Combined, these findings offer insight into the type of discrimination that Black salespersons can encounter within buyer–seller negotiations by revealing how White buyers *perceive* (i.e., expect them to negotiate less; perceive them to have bargained more than they actually did), *behave* (i.e., offer them lower prices) and *intend to behave* (i.e., less willing to refer them to other buyers) toward Black salespersons as compared to White salespersons.

Keywords Buyer–seller negotiations · Race · Black · White · Social dominance orientation

Firms are experiencing increasing pressure to maximize the outcome of each buyer–seller transaction occurring between firms (Agndal et al. 2017; Johnson and Sohi 2016; Sinha and Bagchi 2019). Considering that transactions within most markets occur through a negotiation process between buyer and seller organizations (Alavi et al. 2018; Geiger 2017; Steiner et al. 2016), the outcome of negotiations establishes whether firms can achieve the desired cost and quality, and whether they can outperform their competitors (Anderson et al. 2009; Mintu-Wimsatt and Graham 2004). Negotiations are also common between firms and consumers, as almost half of U.S. consumers negotiate for a better deal on their purchases (Consumer Reports 2013). As such, negotiations have emerged as a key process within organizations and a topic of interest to researchers (Chavan et al. 2019; Campbell et al. 1988; Singh et al. 2020). A negotiation can be described as the process by which two or more parties seek to influence each other

Mark Houston served as Editor for this article.

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-021-00768-0.

✉ David Gligor
dgligor@bus.olemiss.edu

Christopher Newman
cnewman@bus.olemiss.edu

Saim Kashmiri
skashmiri@bus.olemiss.edu

[1] Yvonne and Clyde Edwards Professor and Associate Professor, University of Mississippi, 236 Holman, Oxford, MS 38655, USA

[2] P.M.B. Self Chair of Free Enterprise and Associate Professor of Marketing, University of Mississippi, 238 Holman, Oxford 38655, USA

[3] Mr. and Mrs. James E. King Chair and Associate Professor, University of Mississippi, 336 Holman, Oxford, MS 38655, USA

Published online: 29 January 2021

for the purpose of meeting their individual objectives and possible common goals (Åge and Eklinder-Frick 2017).

In both business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) settings, negotiations are conducted by individuals who can either represent themselves or other stakeholders (Cellich and Jain 2016). The extant negotiation literature shows that individual-level features of the negotiators, such as gender, age, personality, or culture, can impact the negation process and/or its outcomes (Kennedy et al. 2017; Agndal et al. 2017; Alexander et al. 2019; Kappes et al. 2020). However, this stream of research offers incomplete insights considering that the parties engaged in negotiation could also exhibit *racial* differences. That is, extant research is silent on the process of negotiation and its outcomes when the negotiating parties do not belong to the same race. This is a significant limitation in the marketing negotiation literature because research shows that "the personal characteristics of individual bargainers are relevant to an understanding of the process and outcomes of negotiation encounters" (Barry and Friedman 1998, p. 345). Further, it is plausible for racial differences to play a critical role in negotiations considering that "when compared to other traits such as gender or age, race is a more salient attribute for categorization and social comparison" (Gligor 2020, p. 2). The practical importance of addressing this gap is highlighted by studies indicating that it is not uncommon, primarily in the U.S., for the buyer and salesperson to belong to different racial groups (Gligor 2020). In fact, White salespersons account for 80.5% of purchasing managers in the U.S., while Black salespersons account for 8.09% (Data USA 2018). The significance of addressing this research gap is additionally supported by prior literature indicating that Blacks might experience discriminatory treatment (Franco et al. 2020; Leath et al. 2019; Pittman 2020).

The buyer–seller literature has provided evidence that racial differences and similarities can impact how buyers and sellers interact (Comer et al. 1998; Jones et al. 1998; Martin 2005; Krishnan et al. 2019). Underlying these impacts are racial stereotypes that often portray Blacks as poor, incompetent, and lazy (Devine and Elliot 1995; Plous and Williams 1995). Thus, White buyers might perceive Black salespersons to be less qualified, and consequently, believe that they should receive lower rates from Black salespersons (as compared to White salespersons). Thus, we seek to investigate whether White buyers *perceive* Black and White salespersons differently (i.e., expect Blacks to negotiate less; perceive Blacks to have bargained more than they actually did) *behave* differently toward Black salespersons (i.e., offer them lower prices), and/or *intend to behave* differently toward Black salespersons (i.e., be less willing to refer them to other buyers) during sales negotiations. We examine this from the perspective of White (but not Black) buyers because the extant buyer–seller literature indicates that Black buyers do not exhibit negative biases toward other Black salespersons (Gligor 2020).

Moreover, to gain deeper insights, and consistent with literature examining the impact of racial differences, we examine the key role of social dominance orientation (Aiello et al. 2019; Pratto et al. 1994; Tesi et al. 2020). Social dominance orientation (SDO) captures "the degree to which individuals desire social dominance and superiority for themselves and their primordial groups over other groups" (Rubin and Hewstone 2004, p. 209). Research addressing racial phenomena indicates that SDO plays an important role in how individuals interact with those belonging to different racial groups (Holt and Sweitzer 2020). Social dominance studies suggest that White individuals with a high SDO are likely to discriminate against Black individuals, while this is not the case for White individuals with a low SDO (Kemmelmeier 2005; Sidanius and Pratto 2004).

Addressing the identified research gap has important implications for both theory and practice. Black salespersons, and the sales organizations they represent, might experience discrimination and be at a disadvantage during buyer–seller negotiations due to racial stereotypes. This could result in inferior personal outcomes for Black salespersons, as well as lower rates and overall lower revenue for their sales organizations, simply because of their race. Moreover, any form of discrimination is undesirable and ethically condemnable, as it likely has noteworthy negative economic and psychological implications for the individuals (i.e., salespersons) experiencing the discrimination. As such, we seek to contribute to the dialog within marketing literature that raises awareness about discriminatory attitudes and behaviors toward Blacks.

Three studies involving buyers and salespersons were conducted to shed some light on these issues. Study 1 revealed that White buyers with a higher SDO expect Black salespersons to bargain (i.e., negotiate) less than White salespersons. Studies 2a and 2b showed that White buyers with a higher SDO perceive Black salespersons to have bargained more than their White counterparts (who actually bargained the same). Combined, these findings help us address the first part of our research objective by revealing how White buyers *perceive* Black salespersons (as compared to White salespersons). Studies 2a and 2b further showed that White buyers with a higher SDO offer lower prices to Black salespersons than to White salespersons, and are less likely to refer Black salespersons to other prospective buyers. No such effects exist for White buyers with a lower SDO. These findings address the second part of our research objective by providing valuable insight into the behavioral aspect of these racial differences (i.e., how White buyers behave, and intend to behave, toward Black salespersons as compared to White salespersons).

Our first three studies focused on differences between White buyers' reactions to Blacks salespersons as compared to White salespersons. As mentioned, Black buyers were not included in the first three studies because prior work indicates that Black buyers do not typically display negative biases or discriminate toward Black salespersons (Gligor 2020). However, to

empirically rule out this possibility, we replicated Study 1 in a post hoc study with one change: instead of including White buyers, we included Black buyers and examined whether Black buyers with a higher SDO expect Black salespersons to bargain less than White salespersons. As expected, our results indicate that the race of the salesperson does not impact Black buyers' perceptions of their negotiation likelihood—regardless of the buyer's SDO (see Web Appendix A).

Our findings allow us to contribute to several streams of literature. First, we augment the literature on buyer–seller negotiations by providing unique insights into the impact of racial differences and SDO (Geiger and Hüffmeier 2020; Singh et al. 2020; Murphy and Sashi 2018). Second, we expand the research examining diversity in the context of buyer–seller interactions (Gligor 2020; Martin 2005; Krishnan et al. 2019). Third, we make several noteworthy contributions to the marketing literature surrounding racial discrimination, as existing research focuses primarily on discrimination experienced by Black shoppers (Baker et al. 2008; Bennett et al. 2015; Ouellet 2007). Fourth, we contribute to the development of social dominance theory by providing empirical evidence supporting the key role of SDO in buyer–seller negotiations involving Blacks and Whites (Han et al. 2019; Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 2004).

The rest of our manuscript is structured as follows. First, we present the theoretical background and formulate our hypotheses. Second, we introduce our methodology and report our findings. Third, we detail the theoretical and practical contributions of our findings. Finally, we recognize our research's limitations and identify opportunities for future studies.

Conceptual model development

Overview of business buyer–seller negotiations

Negotiations have received substantial scrutiny in the marketing literature because they permeate many aspects of a firm's operations (Åge and Eklinder-Frick 2017). In essence, "anytime people cannot achieve their goals without the cooperation of others, they are negotiating. By this definition, negotiation is a ubiquitous social activity" (Thompson et al. 2010, p. 492). It is a critical activity for firms, as their profits frequently depend on the capabilities of their negotiators (Brooks and Rose 2004).

Considering that firms are "experiencing increasing pressure to achieve the best possible result in each buyer–seller transaction … the analysis of business negotiations should be of key importance in marketing research" (Åge and Eklinder-Frick 2017, p. 525). Similarly, B2C academic studies indicate that consumers frequently engage in negotiations when shopping for goods or services (Alavi et al. 2020; Holmes et al. 2017). As such, scholars have explored various factors that impact the buyer–seller negotiation process and its outcomes, such as team composition (Patton and Balakrishnan 2012), negotiators' age, gender, and personality (Barry and Friedman 1998; Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri 2019; Kappes et al. 2020), interpersonal ties (Kaufmann et al. 2018), communication media (Gattiker et al. 2007), cultural settings (Ribbink and Grimm 2014), leadership (Alavi et al. 2018), information symmetry (Atefi et al. 2020), prior expectations (Kaski et al. 2017), and negotiation context (goods vs. services) (Alavi et al. 2020).

Table 1 offers an overview of the buyer–seller negotiation literature. As shown in Table 1, extant studies examining negotiations between firms provide few insights on the impact of the negotiators' (i.e., firms' representatives to negotiations) race on negotiations.

We use two constructs to meet the first part of our research's objective of evaluating how White buyers *perceive* Black salespersons as compared to White salespersons: perceived negotiation likelihood and perceived negotiation activity. The first construct seeks to capture buyers' perceptions of the salesperson before the negotiation takes place. Consistent with Hernandez et al. (2019), we define perceived negotiation likelihood as the extent to which buyers expect salespersons to negotiate the buyer–suggested terms. The second construct, perceived negotiation activity, captures buyers' perception of the salespersons after the negotiation concluded. That is, perceived negotiation activity captures the extent to which buyers perceived salespersons to have negotiated in terms of how many offers and counteroffers were exchanged during the negotiation (i.e., the intensity of the negotiation). By focusing on these two constructs, we are able to assess buyers' perceptions both pre- and post-negotiation.

Finally, we use two constructs to examine how White buyers *behave* toward Black salespersons as compared to White salespersons: product price and willingness to refer. Product price is one of the main outcomes of negotiations and captures the final agreed upon, or settlement, price (Åge and Eklinder-Frick 2017; Rottenburger and Kaufmann 2020). While the product price reflects how the buyers interacted (i.e., behaved) with salespersons during the negotiation, willingness to refer is indicative of the buyers' future behavioral intentions toward the salespersons after the negotiation has ended. Further, the product price impacts salespersons directly, while willingness to refer impacts them indirectly. As shown in Fig. 1, we examine how White buyers' SDO moderates the impact of salesperson race on perceived negotiation likelihood and negotiation activity, product price, and willingness to refer.

Next, we introduce and describe the concept of SDO because of its potential role in buyers' perceptions and behaviors toward salespersons belonging to different races.

Social dominance orientation

Since the introduction of the concept of SDO in the domain of psychology (Pratto et al. 1994), researchers have argued that

Table 1 Overview of relevant buyer–seller negotiation literature

Publication	Primary research objectives	Methods used	Key constructs	Key findings
Current research	Investigate whether, in an inter-firm context, White buyers *perceive* and *treat* Black salespersons differently than White salespersons.	Mixed-methods: survey and experiment.	Social dominance orientation; Perceived negotiation likelihood; Perceived level of negotiation activity; Willingness to refer; Price.	White buyers with higher SDO expect Black salespersons to bargain less than White salespersons and perceive Black salespersons to bargain more than White counterparts (who bargain the same); Black salespersons will receive a lower product price when negotiating with White buyers with higher SDO than when negotiating with White buyers with lower SDO.
Åge and Eklinder-Frick 2017	Produce a conceptual and general theory of negotiation.	Grounded theory	Goal-oriented balancing; Mindset; Relational strategies; Rational strategies.	Introduces a concept focused on collaboration that is distinct form the concept of "win-win".
Singh et al. 2020	Understand selling effectiveness in B2B e-negotiations.	Longitudinal panel; Text analysis	Information sharing; Recommendation; Promise; Assertiveness; Buyer attention; Contract award.	Concomitant use of internalization-based tactics and compliance enhances buyers' attention, leads to contract award, lowers buyer attention and puts the salesperson at a disadvantage.
Geiger and Hüffmeier 2020	Analyze how changing the number of issues in B2B sales negotiations impacts the negotiation process and outcomes.	Mixed-methods: qualitative and experimental.	Number of issues; Task complexity; Relative joint gain; Integrative judgment accuracy; Buyer concessions on price.	More issues enhance complexity and offer more possibilities for concessions. More issues increase the share of joint profit for sellers.
Schulze-Horn et al. 2020	Explore the role of artificial intelligence in negotiations.	Interviews	Negotiation; Artificial intelligence.	Artificial intelligence can impact the execution of negotiations that are design-based.
Lu et al. 2019	Explore behavioral issues in negotiations.	Experiment	Advice; Be honest; Bluff; Lies; Task difficulty.	Advisees are inclined to accept the advice to bluff and be honest, but not to lie in negotiations.
Rottenburger and Kaufmann 2020	Explore deceptive behavior in B2B negotiations involving new ventures.	Experiment	Deception; Moral disengagement; Liabilities of newness.	Participants perceived negotiators to be less experienced when they worked for new ventures as compared to more established firms.
Sigurðardóttir et al. 2019	Investigate the differences between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics in face-to-face B2B negotiations; Examine how negotiators' styles impact buyers' and sellers' tactics.	Case study; Comparative analysis; Frequency analysis	Number of negotiation strategies; Type of negotiation strategies.	Buyers' and sellers' negotiation tactics differ based on which overall strategy negotiators choose. Sellers typically use a larger number of negotiation tactics than buyers do.
Simkova and Smutny 2019	Evaluate two kinds of online dispute resolution solutions.	Case study	Unassisted negotiation; Smart assisted negotiation.	Generation Y members prefer computer-mediated communication to face-to-face. Such communication allows buyers and sellers and with lower emotional stability to maintain an advantageous position.
Geiger and Laubert 2018	Offer a rich description of issue-based complexity in negotiations.	Interviews	Negotiation strategies; complexity; ambiguity.	Identifies eight strategies for managing complex negotiations.
Rottenburger et al. 2019	Examine the roles of deception in negotiations.	Experiment	Lying; Bluffing.	Corporate codes reduce manifestations of severe deception (lying), but do not reduce less severe forms of deception (bluffing). Bluffing is regarded as a negotiation skill.
Sigurðardóttir et al. 2018	Explore the negotiation tactics used in creative sectors.	Interviews	Negotiation tactics (e.g., traditional cooperative bargaining, attacking opponent's network, false promises, inappropriate information gathering, tacit bargaining, procedure focused, issue focused, aggression, assertion,	Identifies closure-seeking tactics as a means of speeding up the negotiation process and reaching quick agreements.

Table 1 (continued)

Publication	Primary research objectives	Methods used	Key constructs	Key findings
			reserved, progress seeking, option generating, positional information, restructuring, priority information).	
Kaufmann et al. 2018	Advance the research on bounded ethicality.	Experiment	Lies; Bluffs; Psychological consequences.	Lies and bluffs can cause undesirable outcomes for the target.
Geiger 2017	Discover, describe, and analyze negotiation-based tactics.	Semi-structured interviews	Negotiation tactics.	Identifies 11 tactics that address the order, number, and characteristics of negotiation issues.
Khakhar and Ahmed 2017	Understand the impact of social power on negotiations.	Survey	Expert power; Information power; Referent power; Legitimate power; Cooperative outcomes	Some types of social power (information power, expert power, referent power) impact the negotiation process.
Pawar et al. 2017	Explore the evolution of electronic reverse auctions.	Literature review	Electronic reverse auctions	Some of the benefits of electronic reverse auctions are reduced prices and time for buyers, increased seller competition, improved purchasing process efficiency, and real time market price.
Rogers and Fells 2017	Provide insights into the actions and attitudes that lead to relationship management success.	Interviews	Relationship management; Negotiations; Supplier selection; Contract phase.	Framework of key considerations of successful relationship management in negotiations.
Moosmayer et al. 2016	Explore ethical reasoning in B2B negotiations	In-depth interviews	Ethical reasoning	Negotiators can resort to teleological justification to create trust rather than economic safeguards.
Ribbink and Grimm 2014	Investigate the impact of culture on negotiations.	Experiment	Bargaining strategy; Cultural differences; Trust; Joint profits.	Buyer–salesperson cultural differences reduce joint profits.
Patton and Balakrishnan 2012	Examine how agenda strategies can contribute to economic gain and customer relationships when a solo salesperson negotiates with a buying team.	Experiment	Simultaneous negotiations; Sequential negotiations; Number of buyers; Number of salespeople; Bargaining behavior; Negotiation style; Profit; Satisfaction.	Under both approaches (simultaneous and sequential) buyers have similar levels of bargaining styles, levels of perceived power, raised aspirations, levels of profit and satisfaction.
Moosmayer et al. 2013	Understand the annual price negotiations processes of firms	Neural network model; Regression	Neural network	Price targets should be actively managed.
Wilken et al. 2013	Explore the impact of cultural moderators on negotiation processes and outcomes.	Experiment	Team-level collectivism and composition; Use of integrative and distributive negotiation strategy; Seller team individual profit; Joint profit.	Cultural moderators improve team results. These benefits depend on the cultural moderator's negotiation goals and background.
Graf et al. 2012	Understand the impact of power distance in electronic negotiations	Experiment	Culture; Power distance; Negotiation behavior.	In hierarchical cultures sellers exhibit more effort in negotiations while buyers apply more power-related strategies. In egalitarian cultures, buyers prefer negotiation behavior spreading power.
Herbst et al. 2011	Offer a summary of status quo negotiation research.	Literature review	Published articles.	Need for more marketing research on negotiation.
Schoenherr and Mabert 2011	Distinguish between online and offline procurement and investigate their differences.	Survey	Online reverse auctions; Future orientation; Item specification; Market availability; Purchase importance.	Offline purchasing is preferred when the purchase is highly important, and auctions are preferred when more suppliers are available and willing to bid.
Malshe et al. 2010	Investigate the role of deceit, relativism, and opportunism in negotiations.	Survey	Relativism; Inappropriate information gathering; Information misrepresentation; Attacking opponent network; Making false promises; Competitive bargaining; Opportunism.	Opportunism, relativism, and deceitful tactics impact attitudes toward unethical negotiation tactics.
Golicic et al. 2008				

Table 1 (continued)

Publication	Primary research objectives	Methods used	Key constructs	Key findings
	Propose optimization models that can assist buyer–seller negotiations.	Data envelopment analysis; Multi-criteria decision models.	Negotiation strategies; Cost; Quality; Delivery performance.	Suppliers are categorized into efficient and inefficient performers. Uncovers cost, delivery performance, and quality–effective negotiation strategies.
Schoop et al. 2008	Explore the antecedents of renegotiations.	Survey; Regression.	Rule of interaction; Renegotiation; Task complexity; Business relationship.	Renegotiation complexity is predicted by task complexity, rules of interaction, and business relationship.
Kozicki 2007	Understand what improves creativity in negotiations.	Case studies	Creativity	Creativity in negotiations is enhanced by six thinking hats: information, process, positivity, risk, creativity, and intuition.
Fang 2006	Examine the nature of Chinese negotiating style in Sino-Western business negotiations.	Interviews	Negotiating styles.	Chinese negotiators do not have a unique style; they display a mix of different roles (e.g., Confucian gentleman, Maoist bureaucrat in learning; Sun-Tzu-like strategist).
Harwood 2006	Explore verbal negotiator behavior.	Multi-method: Semi-structured interviews and questionnaires	Patterns of verbal behavior.	Distinct patterns of verbal behavior exist at various states of relational development.
Lee and Kwon 2006	Explore the use of secondary terms in negotiations	Structured questionnaire	Formalization; Reuse; Problem-solving phase.	Framework for improving decision performance in B2B negotiations.
Al-Khatib et al. 2005	Examine the impact of relativism, idealism, and Machiavellianism on the perceived appropriateness of opportunistic negotiation tactics.	Survey	Traditional competitive bargaining; Attacking opponents' network; False promises; Misrepresentation of information; Inappropriate information gathering.	Machiavellianism and idealism are predictors of perceptions of the ethical appropriateness of negotiating tactics.
Elahee and Brooks 2004	Examine the role of trust in negotiating tactics	Survey	Trust; Tacit bargaining; Traditional competitive bargaining; Misrepresentation; Attacking opponent's network; Inappropriate information gathering.	The type of negotiation (cross-cultural or intra-cultural) impacts how much the negotiator will trust his/her opponent and the possibility of using different negotiation tactics.



Fig. 1 Conceptual model depicting the hypothesized relationships

SDO impacts individuals' attitudes and behaviors toward those belonging to racial groups different than their own (Holt and Sweitzer 2020; Kemmelmeier 2005). In essence, SDO captures the extent to which individuals prefer inequality among social groups (Pratto et al. 1994). The construct has been frequently examined when exploring phenomena across racial groups because "race is a key attribute that people use to categorize themselves and others, making race an influential factor shaping human attitudes and behaviors" (Ta et al. 2018, p. 20).

Individuals with a higher SDO prefer hierarchy-*enhancing* policies and ideologies, while those wither a lower SDO favor hierarchy-*attenuating* policies and ideologies (Tesi et al. 2020). Social dominance theory acknowledges that different individuals within the same racial category (e.g., Whites) hold different attitudes toward individuals belonging to other racial categories, including Blacks (Holt and Sweitzer 2020). Therefore, we consider it important to account for the role of SDO to better understand how White buyers might interact differently with Black salespersons (as compared to White salespersons).

Hypotheses development

Buyer–seller negotiations are conducted by individuals. As such, it is important to recognize that negotiation attitudes and behaviors might be impacted by human attributes (Reimann et al. 2016) such as racially-based stereotypes or biases. Research shows that individuals often employ stereotypes in negotiations to evaluate aspects of the negotiation party's characteristics (Yang et al. 2018). Moreover, individuals often place themselves in groups, which significantly impacts how they interact with each other (Garcia et al. 2017). Race has been shown to be one of the most salient attributes used by individuals to categorize themselves and others (Ta et al. 2018).

Studies have long shown the persistence of racial stereotypes in Black-White interactions. For example, McConahay (1983) found that Blacks and Whites with identical resumes were evaluated differently. More recently, political science studies indicate that Blacks can generally be perceived by respondents as less deserving than Whites. For example, DeSante (2013, p. 349) found that "'hard-working' blacks will be rewarded less and 'lazy' blacks will be punished more than their White counterparts, all else being equal". However, the social dominance literature helps fine-tune this conversation by indicating that not all individuals within a certain group (e.g., Whites) have different attitudes toward individuals belonging to other racial groups (e.g., Blacks) and those in their own group (Aiello et al. 2019; Tesi et al. 2020). That is, while individuals with a high SDO likely favor those belonging to their own racial group, this might not be the case for individuals with a low SDO.

Indeed, there are theoretical arguments which suggest that White buyers with a high SDO might display different attitudes and behaviors toward Black salespersons than they do toward White salespersons. While conducted in different contexts, the studies by Kemmelmeier (2005) and Hernandez et al. (2019) offer interesting insights on how SDO can predict behavior that reflects anti-Black bias. Kemmelmeier (2005) found that White jurors' levels of SDO helped inform guilty verdicts in assault cases evaluated by a mock jury. This author found that the effect was present only in the interaction between the jurors' SDO and the defendant's race. Specifically,

Kemmelmeier (2005) revealed that White jurors with a high SDO were more likely to assign guilt to Black defendants, while White jurors with a low SDO were not inclined to do so. Similarly, Hernandez et al. (2019) argued that job evaluators with a high SDO (these authors use the terms 'racial bias' and 'social dominance orientation' interchangeably) might perceive Black as less deserving of better outcomes than Whites, and thus expect them to be less likely to negotiate higher salaries. Their empirical findings supported this reasoning, revealing that job evaluators with higher SDO expected Black job seekers to negotiate less than White job seekers, while no such effects exist for job evaluators with lower SDO.

Our related arguments are anchored in the precepts of social dominance theory (Sidanius et al. 2004). The concept of worth is central to the theory of social dominance (Pratto et al. 1994). According to this theoretical lens, individuals with higher SDO prefer hierarchical group relations and believe that low-status groups are not worthy of better societal treatment or outcomes (Sidanius and Pratto 2004). Such individuals oppose policies that seek to remedy inequality and manifest discrimination toward low-status groups (Sidanius et al. 2000). Specifically, "individuals high on social dominance orientation might believe that minorities, by and large, should be relegated to relatively lower social status in the form of inferior income, occupations, and positions than those of Whites" (Hernandez et al. 2019, p. 582).

Consistent with this theoretical perspective and the arguments presented above, there are reasons to believe that White buyers with a higher SDO might consider Blacks to be less deserving of positive outcomes, and therefore expect Black salespersons to negotiate less than White salespersons. However, no such effects should occur for White buyers with a lower SDO because they do not hold such biases toward Blacks (Stewart and Tran 2018; Holt and Sweitzer 2020). In order to evaluate these possibilities, we examine the moderating role of SDO as follows:

H1: White buyers' SDO will moderate the relationship between salesperson race and perceived negotiation likelihood, such that White buyers with *higher* SDO will expect Black salespersons to bargain less than White salespersons. No such effects are expected for White buyers with *lower* SDO.

While our first hypothesis posits that White buyers with higher SDO expect Black salespersons to bargain less than White salespersons, there are arguments to subsequently investigate how such buyers react when Black salespersons engage in negotiations (thus violating the racial stereotype-driven expectations that White buyers with higher SDO might hold). Expectations theory (Anderson 1983) and expectancy violation theory (Burgoon 1978) further inform our hypothesis development, as expectations guide individuals' behaviors and consistently affect their interactions with others (Burgoon 2015). More pertinent to the current research, these theories provide insight into the effects of individuals' perceptions of interpersonal interaction by helping explain the consequences of unmet expectations (i.e., expectancy violations). While these theories do recognize the counterintuitive claim that expectation violations can sometimes be favored over expectation confirmation, they do emphasize the difference between positive and negative violations. Positive violations (i.e., positive disconfirmation of expectations) can elicit desirable outcomes (such as satisfaction), while negative violations (i.e., negative disconfirmation of expectations) can provoke undesirable outcomes such as dissatisfaction (Burgoon 2015).

Attitudes serve as anchors, such that individuals with extreme positions on certain issues are highly resistant to accepting ideas that are not consistent with their existing beliefs (Upshaw 1962). Thus, buyers' anchoring levels can exacerbate their perception of the actual negotiating behavior of Black salespersons. Considering that White individuals with higher SDO are likely to believe that "Blacks should not push for more" (Hernandez et al. 2019, p. 582), such buyers are likely to generally perceive a Black salesperson's level of negotiation activity (i.e., the number of offers/counteroffers put forth by the salesperson before settling) higher than they would a similar level of bargaining displayed by a White salesperson. This is because White buyers with higher SDO might perceive Black salespersons as violating racial stereotypes when they negotiate (i.e., Blacks are not deserving of higher rates). This negative violation would likely exacerbate such buyers' perceptions of how much the Black salespersons negotiated. These effects are not likely to exist for White buyers with lower SDO, however, because they do not hold race-stereotypic expectations (Stewart and Tran 2018; Holt and Sweitzer 2020).

The literature on selective perception also further helps explain why White buyers with higher SDO might develop a biased perception of Black salespersons when negotiating. According to selective perception theory, individuals focus their attention on certain stimuli and ignore those that contradict their expectations or values (Dearborn and Simon 1958; Taylor et al. 2006). As such, it is plausible that White buyers high on SDO are likely to ignore how much Black salespersons *actually* negotiated, and instead develop the perception that they negotiated more than White salespersons. This is due to the notion that White buyers with higher SDO are more likely to readily detect, and focus on, Black salespersons' negotiation behavior, while devoting less attention to White salespersons' expected negotiation behaviors (and thus, are not as sensitive to). Therefore, we predict the following:

H2: White buyers' SDO will moderate the relationship between salesperson race and perceived level of negotiation activity, such that White buyers with *higher* SDO will perceive Black salespersons to have bargained more than

White salespersons. No such effects are expected for White buyers with *lower* SDO.

Product price is often the key outcome of negotiations (Rottenburger and Kaufmann 2020). Negotiation studies show that the outcome of a price negotiation is influenced by buyers' and the salespersons' respective personal attributes and differences (Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri 2019; Moosmayer et al. 2013). Further, research shows that individuals' predictions and expectations regarding the outcome of negotiations determine how hard they will push to obtain their desired outcome (Ames 2008). In essence, "people's behavior also reflects their expectations about the outcomes of their acts" (Ames 2008, p. 1541). Thus, considering the probable bias and prior expectations of White buyers with higher SDO that Blacks should settle for less (Hernandez et al. 2019), it is plausible that such White buyers would be less likely to concede higher prices/rates when negotiating with Black salespersons (as compared to White salespersons).

Indeed, negotiations entail buyers and salespersons seeking to obtain more favorable terms for themselves (e.g., lower and higher product prices for the buyers and sellers, respectively) (Alavi et al. 2020). The very act of negotiating by Black salespersons may create the perception among White buyers with higher SDO that these salespersons are violating expectations. As mentioned, expectancy violation theory suggests that such negative expectation violations can cause undesirable outcomes for the individuals perceived to be committing the violation (Burgoon and Jones 1976). Consequently, White buyers with higher SDO may extend lower offered product prices to Black salespersons (compared to White salespersons). That is, expectancy violation theory suggests that these White buyers are likely to "punish" Black salespersons for the perceived negative violation (i.e., negative disconfirmation of their prior expectations) by offering them relatively lower product prices. However, no such effects should occur for White buyers with lower SDO because they do not consider Blacks to be less worthy than Whites, and thus, there are no negative expectation violations (Stewart and Tran 2018; Holt and Sweitzer 2020). We propose the following:

H3: White buyers' SDO will moderate the relationship between salesperson race and product price, such that White buyers with *higher* SDO will extend lower product prices to Black salespersons than to White salespersons. No such effects are expected for White buyers with *lower* SDO.

Lastly, although product prices are important in buyer–seller relationships, salespersons are also concerned about buyers' willingness to recommend them to other potential buyers in the future (Wu et al. 2015). Buyers' willingness to recommend and provide referrals is crucial to salespersons for several reasons (Boles et al. 1997). Salespersons have to spend significantly less on customers acquired through referrals than on customers acquired through other channels (Berman 2016). Further, research shows that customers acquired through a referral offer higher margins and are less likely to defect (Van Den Bulte et al. 2018). Considering the previously discussed stereotypes about Blacks (Hernandez et al. 2019), it is possible that White buyers with higher SDO could be less willing to refer Black salespersons than White salespersons to other prospective buyers.

Indeed, buyers are willing to refer salespersons to other potential buyers when the salespersons meet their expectations, but are less willing to do so when they fail to meet their expectations (Sokolinskiy et al. 2019). As mentioned earlier, the very act of negotiation may negatively violate White buyers' expectations when those buyers have a higher SDO. As such, consistent with expectancy violation theory, White buyers with a higher SDO are likely to "punish" Black salespersons (but not White salespersons) by being less likely to refer them to other potential buyers. These effects are not likely to exist for White buyers low on SDO because they do not have the same bias toward Blacks and will not experience negative disconfirmation of their expectations (Stewart and Tran 2018; Holt and Sweitzer 2020). Accordingly, we predict:

H4: White buyers' SDO will moderate the relationship between salesperson race and willingness to refer, such that White buyers with *higher* SDO will be less likely to refer Black salespersons than White salespersons to other prospective buyers. No such effects are expected for White buyers with *lower* SDO.

Study 1

Procedure and participants

The purpose of Study 1 was to test H1. We obtained the contact information of 1785 business buyers from Dunn and Bradstreet and supplemented this sample with 471 business buyers obtained from a private U.S. university's database. As such, the final sample size consisted of 2256 buyer (purchasing) managers. Following two email reminders sent one week apart, 234 buyers agreed to take part in the study. However, because extant literature does not indicate that Black individuals (e.g., Black buyers) would have a biased perception of other Blacks' actions (see Gligor 2020), the 22 Black respondents were not included in the final sample. As such, the final sample consisted of 212 White buyers. The average purchasing experience for the buyers was 13.5 years (SD = 3.7), average time with the current employer was 5.4 years (SD = 3.5), and average participant age was 45.7 years (SD = 12.3). From a gender perspective, the sample contained 56.72% males. We offer a summary of the buyers' respective industries in Appendix 1 Table 13.

We created two scenarios depicting a vendor of office supplies (see Appendix 2). Each scenario contained identical seller company information. The scenarios also contained a picture of the salesperson at the top of each vignette. We instructed respondents to imagine playing the role of a business buyer and offering the salesperson an initial price that was 20% below the salesperson's listed manufacturer suggested retail price (MSRP) for the item. We manipulated the race of the salesperson in order to evaluate the buyers' perception of the likelihood of the salesperson to engage in price negotiations. We presented half of the participants with the vignette with a Black male as the salesperson (Scenario 1), and the other half of the participants with the same vignette but with a White male as the salesperson (Scenario 2). We utilized males in both scenarios to eliminate possible gender-related confounding effects.

After viewing their respective vignette, each participant was asked to think about the scenario he/she just read for 2–3 min. Participants then completed a survey that captured the constructs of perceived negotiation likelihood and SDO (in this order).

Measures

Perceived negotiation likelihood was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = extremely unlikely; 7 = extremely likely) using a scale adapted from Hernandez et al. (2019). The measurement item asked "How likely do you think this salesperson is to negotiate your price offer?"

Social dominance orientation was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = extremely disagree; 7 = extremely agree) using the 16 items developed by Pratto et al. (1994).

Control variables

To increase the explanatory power of our study, consistent with prior studies examining the impact of race, we controlled for respondents' actual race (White/Caucasian, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Other), gender (Male, Female), age (in years), education (Less than 7th grade, Less than High School/GED, High School/GED, Some College, 2-year College Degree, 4-year College Degree, Master's Degree, Doctoral Degree, Professional Degree [JD, MD]), and purchasing experience (in years) (Ta et al. 2018).

Pretesting

Although we adopted our survey items from established scales, we conducted pretesting to ensure adequate psychometric properties. The pretests allowed us to assess the realism, effectiveness, and clarity of the experimental vignettes used in Study 1, as well as any possible differences between the two pictures in Appendix 2 (Scenario 1 and 2). We utilized a sample of 74 MBA students with purchasing experience to assess these issues. We also collected open-ended feedback to further refine the content of the vignettes. Respondents did not report any differences between the two scenarios aside from the race of the individuals. Thus, the pretests provided support for the scales and the experimental design.

Social desirability bias

We also employed a number of precautionary measures to mitigate the threat of social desirability bias. First, we assured participants that their responses were anonymous and that there were no correct or incorrect answers to the questions in the studies. Second, we asked the respondents to indicate salespersons' negotiation likelihood before presenting the items intended to measure SDO; this helped ensure that the intent of the study was not signaled to respondents. Third, we followed Ta et al.'s (2018) approach and included two items from Crowne and Marlowe's (1960) social desirability scale in our post-experience surveys: 1) "I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way" and 2) "I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget" (7-point Likert scale). Consistent with extant recommendations, we tested the direct impact of the social desirability measure on the dependent variables, including the moderators (interaction variables), and found that the paths were not statistically significant (Hartmann and Moeller 2014). Overall, we found no evidence that participants distorted their responses to portray themselves as "non-discriminatory".

Psychometric properties and common method bias

The only multi-item construct in Study 1 was SDO. The psychometric properties of this scale were satisfactory, with the coefficient omega of 0.75 and the average variance extracted of 0.63 indicating adequate convergent validity.

The independent variable 'salesperson's race' was manipulated, thus helping reduce the threat of common method bias. The low inter-variable correlations (Table 2) also indicate that common method bias did not impact the results. We examined homoscedasticity with the Breush-Pagan test ($p > .005$) and did not find evidence of any heteroscedasticity problems. In addition, prior to hypothesis testing, we checked for influential points using Cook's distance, DFFITS, and DEBETAS (Rahman et al. 2012).

Results and discussion

Hypothesis 1 was examined using hierarchical regression analysis. The steps employed are presented in Table 3 along with the analysis results. We applied mean-centering prior to

Table 2 Study 1: Inter-item correlations

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Salesperson Race (1)	.						
Buyer SDO (2)	−.07	.					
Perceived negotiation likelihood (3)	−.06	−.39	.				
Gender (4)	.02	.07	.11	.			
Age (5)	.01	.10	.03	.06	.		
Education (6)	.06	.11	.11	.05	.20*	.	
Purchasing experience (7)	.01	.05	.03	.02	.22*	.26*	.
Mean	.50	4.02	5.21	.	45.7	.	13.5
Standard deviation	.50	.62	1.04	.	12.3	.	3.7

Note: Sample size is 212. *p < .05

the construction of interaction terms. Multicollinearity was not a threat (VIF = 1.119), and the results of the Cook-Weisberg test indicated that heteroscedasticity was not a problem. Salesperson Race was dummy coded (Black =1; White = 0). Step 2 in Table 3, resulting from the addition of the interaction term, accounted for 23% of the variance of perceived negotiation likelihood (a significant increase over Step 1 by 6 %). Hypothesis 1 was supported as the Salesperson Race x Buyer SDO interaction term was statistically significant ($\beta = -0.34$; SE = 0.05; $p < 0.05$). As shown in Fig. 2, the simple slopes indicate that buyers with *higher* SDO perceived Black salespersons to be less likely to negotiate as compared to White salespersons (b = −1.60, SE = 0.19; p < 0.05). However, this effect was not significant for those with *lower* SDO (b = −.17, SE = 0.74; $p = .19$). The higher and lower levels of SDO were considered at one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. In sum, these results provide support for Hypothesis 1.

The Study 1 results indicate that salesperson race does impact White buyers' perception of salesperson negotiation likelihood. However, this effect only occurs for those buyers who display higher levels of SDO. We next aim to build on these initial findings by testing hypotheses 2–4 in both Study 2a and Study 2b. However, a critical distinction existed between Studies 2a and 2b: in Study 2a, we ensured that each dyad exchanged an equal number of offers/counteroffers, while we did not give any instructions on how many times the dyads should make offers/counteroffers in Study 2b. Instead, we told the Study 2b participants to negotiate until they reached an agreement. In sum, we tested the hypotheses with two distinct studies to ensure the research design did not bias the results. We offer details on the participants and procedures of each study independently before jointly presenting the results of both studies.

Table 3 Study 1: Regression analysis results for assessing perceived negotiation likelihood

Variable	Step 1	Step 2
Salesperson Race (SR)	−.16 (.08)	−.14 (.11)
Buyer SDO (SDO)	−.29*(.04)	−.25*(.09)
SR x SDO		−.34*(.05)
Gender	.11(.17)	.11(.14)
Age	.13(.14)	.09(.11)
Education	.11(.25)	.09(.23)
Purchasing experience	.05(.20)	.04(.19)
Adjusted R^2	.17	.23
ΔR^2		.06*

Note: Sample size is 212; *$p < .05$. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors

Study 2a

Procedure and participants

The purpose of Study 2a was to test H2–H4. For Study 2a, we recruited buyer (purchasing) managers over the course of several months from participants in executive education training courses offered by a business consulting firm in the Northeast region of the U.S. The participants agreed to assist with the study in exchange for a discounted course registration rate. The sample ($N = 156$) consisted of 117 White participants and 39 Black participants. The average industry experience for the buyers was 9.3 years (SD = 4.1), average time with the current employer was 4.2 years (SD = 3.1), average participant age was 38.1 years (SD = 10.2), and 61.2% of the sample were males. We grouped participants to form 78 buyer–seller dyads: 39 Black salesperson-White buyer dyads and 39 White salesperson-White buyer dyads. That is, for half of the pairs (i.e., 39 dyads), a Black male participant was assigned to play the role of the salesperson, and for the other half (i.e., 39 dyads) a White male participant was assigned to play the role of the salesperson.



Fig. 2 Study 1. The moderating effect of White buyers' SDO on the relationship between salesperson race and perceived negotiation likelihood

We advised participants that both the buyer and seller companies were large publicly traded multinationals and have been long-term collaborators. They were also told that the managers of those firms (i.e., buyers and salespersons) have personally interacted before on other business transactions. Further, we gave them clear, written instructions regarding their individual roles in the negotiation process. Each buyer–salesperson pair had to negotiate four aspects of a new sourcing contract: product price, delivery lead time, number of days to return the product, and number of days to complete payment. We advised participants that the negotiating ranges were as follows: product price $10–$20, delivery lead time 1–20 days, number of days to return the product 1–20 days, and number of days to complete payment 1–20 days.

We also gave each dyad specific instructions on how many times they should make offers/counteroffers. We asked the salespersons to make the initial offer for each item on the negotiating list. Specifically, for *product price,* we instructed the salesperson to reject three counteroffers and accept the fourth one; for *delivery lead time*, we instructed the salesperson to reject two counteroffers and accept the third one; for *number of days to return the product,* we instructed the salesperson to reject three counteroffers and accept the fourth one; and for *number of days to complete the payment*, we instructed the salesperson to reject the first two counteroffers and accept the third one. We told buyers to continue making counteroffers until the salesperson accepted the offer, and to adjust the terms and wait five seconds before countering each time that they countered. We did not give buyers any direction on the number of offers/counteroffers that ought to occur.

We also ensured that the number of offers and counteroffers that each dyad exchanged was consistent, along with the duration of the negotiations. This helped ensure that any differences in buyers' perceived level of salesperson negotiation activity was in fact due to race and buyers' levels of SDO (and not due to the possibility that salespersons of one race actually negotiated more or less than salespersons of the other race).

We advised both parties that product price was ultimately the most important aspect of the negotiation process for their respective firms. We also instructed participants to negotiate product price after negotiating all of the other aspects of the contract terms first. We purposefully primed the participants to focus on product price, as one of the objectives of the experiment was to assess whether Black salespersons perceived to have bargained intensely receive lower product prices than White salespersons perceived to have bargained with the same intensity. SDO was assessed at the end of the experiment so participants would not be cued about the experiment's focus on race. Each buyer–salesperson dyad conducted the negotiation in a separate room to avoid possible confounds. Participants did not know the racial composition of the other negotiating dyads. One of the study investigators observed each negotiation to ensure that participants followed all directions.

Measures

Social dominance orientation was measured using the same scale utilized in study 1

Perceived level of negotiation activity was measured by asking buyers to reveal how many offers and counteroffers were exchanged throughout the negotiation.

Product price was operationalized by asking buyers to reveal the final product price that the pair agreed upon.

Willingness to refer was measured using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) using three items adopted from Boles et al. (1997). Specifically, the buyers were presented the following items: (1) "If this salesperson asked me for the names of other prospective business customers, I would be happy to provide them", (2) "I would not have a problem giving referrals to this salesperson", and

(3) "I would provide referrals to this salesperson if he asked for them".

Controls

Similar to Study 1, we controlled for respondent race, gender, age, education and purchasing experience (Ta et al. 2018). In addition, because the pairs negotiated four aspects of the buyer–seller contract, we also included these four items in the analyses: product price, delivery lead time, number of days to return the product, and number of days to complete payment (measured in days).

Next, we continue with the description of the Study 2b methods before jointly presenting the results for Studies 2a and 2b (for space considerations).

Study 2b

As described earlier, Study 2b had a similar design to Study 2a, except for one key aspect: we did not give buyers or salespersons instructions on how many times they should make offers/counteroffers; that is, we instructed them to negotiate until they reached an agreement in Study 2b. Thus, Study 2b allowed us to confirm that controlling for the number of offers/counteroffers did not bias the results.

Approximately one year after Study 2a was completed, we reached out to the 156 Study 2a participants and asked for their assistance with Study 2b in exchange for a discounted registration rate for future executive education courses. A total of 144 managers agreed to participate. The sample ($N = 144$) consisted of 108 White participants and 36 Black participants. The average industry experience for the buyers was 12.7 years (SD = 4.3), average time with the current employer was 5.8 years (SD = 3.7), average participant age was 41.5 years (SD = 12.1), and 59.6% were males. We grouped participants to form 72 buyer–seller dyads: 36 Black salesperson-White buyer dyads and 36 White salesperson-White buyer dyads. When forming the dyads, we ensured no dyad from Study 2a was replicated. That is, each participant had a new negotiating partner. Further, we asked each individual to describe the nature of the previous study. Given that one year had passed since we collected data for Study 2a, the Study 2b participants reported very vague recollection of Study 2a; this helped further ensure participants were not aware of the study's objectives. One of the study investigators observed each negotiation to ensure directions were followed.

Psychometric properties and common method bias for study 2a and study 2b

The two multi-item constructs in Study 2a and Study 2b were SDO and Willingness to Refer. The factor loadings, coefficient omega, and average variance extracted are presented in Table 4 and indicate adequate reliability (Bentler 2009). The average variance extracted for each pair of constructs is greater than their squared correlation, thus providing evidence of discriminant validity. We also assessed discriminant validity using the heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) method (Henseler et al. 2015). The confidence interval did not include the value of one, indicating that SDO and Willingness to Refer passed this test (Study 2a: HTMT = 0.801; Confidence interval = [0.538; 0.836]; Study 2b: HTMT = 0.824; Confidence interval = [0.603; 0.869]). Lastly, the Breush-Pagan test ($p > .005$) did not indicate evidence of heteroscedasticity problems. Similar to Study 1, we also checked for influential points using Cook's distance, DFFITS, and DEBETAS (Rahman et al. 2012).

Results and discussion for study 2a and study 2b

Table 5 (Study 2a) and Table 6 (Study 2b) present a summary of the descriptive statistics. Multicollinearity was not a threat (Study 2a: VIF = 1.118; Study 2b: VIF = 1.259), and the results of the Cook-Weisberg test further indicated that heteroscedasticity was not a problem. We took similar measures to those employed in Study 1 to execute the regression analysis steps. As shown in Table 7 (Study 2a) and Table 8 (Study 2b), Step 2, which resulted from the addition of the interaction term, accounted for a significant increase over Step 1 (Study 2a: 5 %; Study 2b: 4 %). In addition, the Salesperson Race x Buyer SDO interaction term was statistically significant for perceived negotiation activity (Study 2a: $\beta = 0.28$; SE = 0.16; $p < 0.05$; Study 2b: $\beta = 0.30$; SE = 0.13; $p < 0.05$). Results show that White buyers with *higher* SDO perceived Black salespersons to have bargained more than White salespersons (Study 2a: b = 5.04, SE = 0.14; $p < 0.05$; Study 2b: b = 6.87, SE = 0.12; $p < 0.05$). However, this effect was not significant for those buyers with *lower* SDO (Study 2a: b = .53, SE = 0.62; $p = .27$; Study 2b: b = .82, SE = 0.48; $p = .19$). The simple slopes are presented in Fig. 3a and b. In sum, these results collectively provide support for H2.

Next, the Salesperson Race x Buyer SDO interaction term was statistically significant for the final negotiated product price (Study 2a: $\beta = -0.24$; SE = 0.12; $p < 0.05$; Study 2b: $\beta = -0.29$; SE = 0.15; $p < 0.05$). The results in Tables 9 and 10 indicate that the addition of the Salesperson Race x SDO interaction term accounted for a significant increase over Step 1 (Study 2a: 4 %; Study 2b: 6 %). Results indicate that Black salespersons receive lower product prices than White salespersons when negotiating with White buyers *higher* on SDO (Study 2a: b = −3.4, SE = 0.20; $p < 0.05$; Study 2b: b = −4.8, SE = 0.19; $p < 0.05$), while no such effect was observed for White buyers *lower* on SDO (Study 2a: b = −0.25, SE = 0.41; $p = 0.25$; Study 2b: b = −0.31, SE = 0.61; $p = 0.19$). The

Table 4 Study 2a and 2b: Psychometric properties of multi-item scales

Construct	Study 2a / Study 2b			
	Loading	CR	Omega	AVE
Social dominance orientation		0.81/0.79	0.80/0.78	0.66/0.65
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	0.83/0.85			
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.	0.85/0.81			
3. It is OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.	0.82/0.83			
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	0.88/0.84			
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	0.76/0.79			
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.	0.72/0.75			
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.	0.84/0.79			
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	0.81/0.78			
9. It would be good if groups could be equal (Reverse coded).	0.86/0.84			
10. Group equality should be our ideal (Reverse coded)	0.80/0.82			
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life (Reverse coded).	0.79/0.76			
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups (Reverse coded).	0.84/0.88			
13. Increased social equality (Reverse coded).	0.80/0.78			
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally (Reverse coded)	0.83/0.81			
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible (Reverse coded).	0.81/0.80			
16. No one group should dominate in society (Reverse coded).	0.78/0.73			
Willingness to Refer		0.79/0.81	0.78/0.80	0.65/0.69
1. If this salesperson asked me for the names of other prospective business customers, I would be happy to provide them.	0.76/0.75			
2. I would not have a problem giving referrals to this salesperson.	0.82/0.88			
3. I would provide referrals to this salesperson if he asked for them	0.84/0.85			

simple slopes are depicted in Fig. 4a and b. Combined, these results provide support for H3.

Finally, the Salesperson Race x Buyer SDO interaction term was statistically significant for willingness to refer (Study 2a: $\beta = -0.32$; $SE = 0.11$; $p < 0.05$; Study 2b: $\beta = -0.38$; $SE = 0.11$; $p < 0.05$). The results in Tables 11 and 12 show that the addition of the interaction term led to a significant increase over Step 1 (Study 2a: 5 %; Study 2b: 4 %). Results show that White buyers *higher* on SDO were less likely to refer Black salespersons than White salespersons (Study 2a: $b = -2.40$, $SE = 0.17$; $p < 0.05$; Study 2b: $b = -3.30$, $SE = 0.16$; $p < 0.05$). However, no such effect was observed for White buyers *lower* on SDO (Study 2a: $b = -0.07$, $SE = 0.24$; $p = 0.19$; Study 2b: $b = -0.12$, $SE = 0.48$; $p = 0.16$). The simple slopes are depicted in Fig. 5a and b. Combined, these results provide support for H4.

Post hoc study

Our studies thus far have focused on differences between White buyers' perceptions of, and reactions to, Blacks salespersons as compared to White salespersons. We did not include Black buyers in our samples to this point because

Table 5 Study 2a: Inter-item correlations

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Salesperson Race (1)	.											
Buyer SDO (2)	−.06	.										
Perceived level of negotiation activity (3)	.04	.35	.									
Willingness to refer (4)	−.07	−.06	.11	.								
Product price (5)	−.11	−.11	.23*	.12	.							
Lead time (6)	−.12	−.13	.18*	.20*	.22*	.						
Days return (7)	.08	.09	.16	.06	.21*	.18*	.					
Days payment (8)	.01	.06	.15	.05	.24*	.20*	.26*	.				
Gender (9)	.02	.10	.07	.02	.03	.02	.03	.01	.			
Age (10)	.04	.08	.03	.05	.04	.02	.04	.01	.04	.		
Education (11)	.02	.12	.01	.02	.08	.07	.01	.04	.05	.01	.	
Purchasing experience (12)	.01	.05	.02	.01	.01	.04	.18*	.23*	.01	.01	.03	.
Mean	.	3.78	23.8	5.7	16.9	8.4	16.1	119.9	.	38.1	.	9.3
Standard deviation	.	1.2	2.3	1.1	2.4	5.4	3.2	5.5	.	10.2	.	4.1

Note: Sample size is 156; *p < .05

studies indicate that Black buyers do not typically display negative bias or discriminate toward Black salespersons (Gligor 2020). However, to empirically rule out this possibility, we replicated Study 1 in a post hoc study (see Web Appendix A) with one key change: instead of including White buyers, we included Black buyers and examined whether Black buyers with higher SDO expected Black salespersons to bargain less than White salespersons. The methods and results of this study are presented online in Web Appendix A. Findings indicated that the SDO's of Black buyers did not lead to differences in the expected negation likelihood of Black and White salespersons. That is, the findings of the post hoc study offered evidence that our focus on White buyers (i.e., not including Black buyers in our samples) was appropriate.

Discussion

Despite the evidence in other domains that Black individuals can experience discriminatory treatment (Dipboye and Halverson 2004; Jones et al. 2016), marketing

Table 6 Study 2b: Inter-item correlations

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Salesperson Race (1)	.											
Buyer SDO (2)	−.02	.										
Perceived level of negotiation activity (3)	.02	.37	.									
Willingness to refer (4)	−.11	−.04	.08	.								
Product price (5)	−.08	−.09	.20*	.13	.							
Lead time (6)	−.12	−.14	.23*	.23*	.28*	.						
Days return (7)	.03	.03	.14	.09	.20*	.22*	.					
Days payment (8)	.08	.04	.15	.01	.21*	.19*	.24*	.				
Gender (9)	.04	.09	.10	.04	.07	.02	.01	.03	.			
Age (10)	.03	.06	.01	.09	.02	.02	.01	.01	0.11	.		
Education (11)	.01	.08	.01	.02	.03	.04	.03	.02	.08	.01	.	
Purchasing experience (12)	.01	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.20*	.23*	.02	.03	.02	.
Mean	.	4.32	26.1	5.3	15.2	6.1	13.7	12.6	.	41.5	.	12.7
Standard deviation		.91	3.4	1.8	3.1	4.8	2.9	4.8	.	12.1	.	4.3

Note: Sample size is 144; *p < .05

Table 7 Study 2a: Regression analysis results assessing perceived negotiation activity

Variable	Step 1	Step 2
Salesperson Race (SR)	.13(.14)	.12(.12)
Buyer SDO (SDO)	.25*(.13)	.24*(.14)
SR x SDO		.28*(.16)
Lead time	.05(.12)	.06(.13)
Days return	.03(.19)	.02(.17)
Days payment	.06(.08)	.05(.07)
Product price	.10(.28)	.08(21)
Gender	.02(.38)	.01(.30)
Age	.03(.11)	.02(.19)
Education	.09(.23)	.07(.21)
Purchasing experience	.04(.21)	.02(.14)
Adjusted R^2	.13	.18
ΔR^2		.05*

Note: Sample size is 156; *p < .05

research offers few insights into how Black salespersons are perceived and treated within buyer–seller negotiations. We address this limitation in the literature by conducting a series of experimental studies. Our findings offer interesting theoretical and managerial implications.

Importantly, aside from its theoretical and practical implications, our main hope is that this manuscript will help further raise awareness and discourage racism and discriminatory attitudes and behaviors toward Blacks.

Table 8 Study 2b: Regression analysis results assessing perceived negotiation activity

Variable	Step 1	Step 2
Salesperson Race (SR)	.09(.11)	.09(.17)
Buyer SDO (SDO)	.22*(.16)	.21*(.22)
SR x SDO		.30*(.13)
Lead time	.03(.19)	.02(.15)
Days return	.02(.12)	.01(.11)
Days payment	.04(.15)	.02(.10)
Product price	.13(.32)	.11(27)
Gender	.06(.29)	.05(.32)
Age	.08(.17)	.04(.12)
Education	.16(.29)	.16(.20)
Purchasing experience	.11(.31)	.08(.21)
Adjusted R^2	.12	.16
ΔR^2		.04*

Note: Sample size is 144; *p < .05

Theoretical implications

Our findings offer some unique contributions to the marketing literature on buyer–seller negotiations (Åge and Eklinder-Frick 2017; Alavi et al. 2020; Atefi et al. 2020; Geiger and Hüffmeier 2020; Singh et al. 2020; Murphy and Sashi 2018). Past studies have examined various factors that impact the process and outcomes of negotiations (see Table 1 for an overview). Although past research has established the important role of individuals' physical attributes in the negotiation process, little is known about how race impacts buyer–seller negotiations (Yang et al. 2018). To that end, our research extends this stream of marketing literature in several ways.

First, our findings show that, in the context of buyer–seller relationships, the impact of salesperson race on White buyers' expectations that the salesperson will engage in negotiations is influenced by buyers' levels of SDO. Specifically, we found evidence that White buyers with higher SDO expect Black salespersons to bargain less than White salespersons.

Second, our findings showed that White buyers' SDO also influences their perceptions of how intensely the salesperson actually negotiated. More specifically, White buyers with higher SDO perceived Black salespersons to have bargained more than White salespersons.

Third, we showed that Black salespersons received a lower product price than White salespersons when negotiating with White buyers who have a higher SDO. We then further showed that Black salespersons are less likely than White salespersons to be referred to other prospective buyers when negotiating with White buyers higher on SDO. Interestingly, none of the differences described above exist for White buyers *lower* on SDO.

Lastly, we empirically ruled out the possibility that Black buyers perceive differences in the negotiation likelihood of Black and White salespersons. Specifically, we showed that there were no differences in Black buyers' expectations of Black and White salespersons' negotiation levels - regardless of buyers' SDO. These results strengthen our overall findings, and offer additional support for examining primarily White buyers' (rather than Black buyers') perceptions and behaviors toward Black salespersons.

Our findings also augment the negotiations literature that examines the impact of various differences between negotiators, such as gender (Kennedy et al. 2017; Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999), personality (Agndal et al. 2017; Pullins et al. 2000), and culture (Alexander et al. 2019; Campbell et al. 1988; Mintu-Wimsatt and Gassenheimer 1996; Ribbink and Grimm 2014). Our results complement this body of work by indicating that racial differences play an important role in the negotiation process. Specifically, we showed that White buyers with a higher SDO *perceived* Black and White salespersons differently (i.e., expected Blacks to negotiate less; perceived Blacks to have bargained more than they



Fig. 3 **a** Study 2a: The moderating effect of White buyers' SDO on the relationship between salesperson race and perceived level of negotiation activity. b Study 2b: The moderating effect of White buyers' SDO on the relationship between salesperson race and perceived level of negotiation activity

Table 9 Study 2a: Regression analysis results assessing negotiated product price

Variable	Step 1	Step 2
Salesperson Race (SR)	−.15(.17)	−.14(.15)
Buyer SDO (SDO)	−.21*(.15)	−.20*(.19)
SR x SDO		−.24*(.12)
Lead time	−.08(.20)	−.07(.17)
Days return	.03(.18)	.02(.23)
Days payment	−.11(.24)	−.09(.22)
Gender	.05(.03)	.04(.12)
Age	.02(.12)	.01(.14)
Education	.05(.22)	.03(.18)
Purchasing experience	.04(.37)	.02(.33)
Adjusted R^2	.22	.26
ΔR^2		.04*

Note: Sample size is 156; *p < .05

Table 10 Study 2b: Regression analysis results assessing negotiated product price

Variable	Step 1	Step 2
Salesperson Race (SR)	−.11(.20)	−.11(.19)
Buyer SDO (SDO)	−.28*(.19)	−.25*(.24)
SR x SDO		−.29*(.15)
Lead time	−.02(.12)	−.01(.07)
Days return	.01(.19)	.01(.17)
Days payment	−.04(.08)	−.04(.13)
Gender	.09(.31)	.05(.11)
Age	.03(.22)	.01(.12)
Education	.02(.14)	.02(.17)
Purchasing experience	.02(.24)	.01(.20)
Adjusted R^2	.24	.30
ΔR^2		.06*

Note: Sample size is 144; *p < .05



Fig. 4 **a** Study 2a: The moderating effect of White buyers' SDO on the relationship between salesperson race and product price. **b** Study 2b: The moderating effect of White buyers' SDO on the relationship between salesperson race and product price

Table 11 Study 2a: Regression analysis results assessing willingness to refer

Variable	Step 1	Step 2
Salesperson Race (SR)	−.13(.15)	−.13(.17)
Buyer SDO (SDO)	−.29*(.18)	−.26*(.14)
SR x SDO		−.32*(.11)
Lead time	−.04(.14)	−.04(.15)
Days return	.06(.26)	.05(.22)
Days payment	−.03 (.45)	−.03(.39)
Product price	.13(.11)	.12(.13)
Gender	.05(.16)	.05(.19)
Age	.01(.12)	.02(.15)
Education	.01(.19)	.01(.10)
Purchasing experience	.05(.27)	.03(.29)
Adjusted R^2	.19	.24
ΔR^2		.05*

Note: Sample size is 156; *p < .05

Table 12 Study 2b: Regression analysis results assessing willingness to refer

Variable	Step 1	Step 2
Salesperson Race (SR)	−.07(.23)	−.04(.21)
Buyer SDO (SDO)	−.34*(.20)	−.29*(.27)
SR x SDO		−.38*(.11)
Lead time	−.08(.11)	−.07(.17)
Days return	.02(.08)	.03(.14)
Days payment	−.02 (.31)	−.01(.23)
Product price	.10(.19)	.10(.25)
Gender	.09(.12)	.04(.29)
Age	.14(.17)	.11(.12)
Education	.11(.28)	.08(.22)
Purchasing experience	.13(.30)	.12(.25)
Adjusted R^2	.21	.25
ΔR^2		.04*

Note: Sample size is 144; *p < .05



Fig. 5 **a** Study 2a: The moderating effect of White buyers' SDO on the relationship between salesperson race and willingness to refer. **b** Study 2b: The moderating effect of White buyers' SDO on the relationship between salesperson race and willingness to refer

actually did), *behaved* differently toward Black salespersons during negotiations (i.e., offered them lower prices), and *intended to behave* differently toward Black salespersons in the future (i.e., were less willing to refer them to other buyers).

Further, we contribute to the buyer–seller literature examining the impact of diversity in the context of buyer–seller interactions (Comer et al. 1998; Jones et al. 1998; Martin 2005; Krishnan et al. 2019). For example, Comer et al. (1998) examined diversity in the salesforce by focusing on some of the challenges that salespersons face, while Jones et al. (1998) explored how salespersons' gender and race impact consumers' purchase intentions. Martin (2005) investigated performance and perception differences across White and Black salespersons, Gligor (2020) more recently examined the impact of salesperson race on the supplier selection process. Specifically, we contribute to this stream of literature by revealing the impact of race in the negotiations that occur between buyers and sellers.

Our research also builds upon the scarce marketing literature addressing racial discrimination. The majority of marketing studies addressing racial discrimination do so in a B2C context by examining various forms of discrimination that shoppers experience (Baker et al. 2008; Bennett et al. 2015; Ouellet 2007; Schreer et al. 2009). We contribute to this stream of research by further uncovering the types of discrimination that Blacks can experience in marketing exchanges (namely negotiations). To our knowledge, our research is the first to attempt this, and we hope that doing so will lead to additional marketing studies that address the topic of discrimination.

In addition, we make some novel contributions to the broader stream of business literature examining discrimination (Dhanani et al. 2018; Jones et al. 2016; Posthuma and Campion 2009; Triana et al. 2015). We augment this literature with several new insights from the marketing domain.

Previous studies in other fields have exclusively focused on discrimination against individuals and have not examined the more specific, complex scenarios where individuals act as salespersons. For example, prior research showed that minorities can experience income discrimination when considered as individuals (Avery et al. 2018; Hernandez et al. 2019). Our findings show that minorities (specifically Blacks) can also experience discrimination when performing the role of a salesperson, specifically.

Finally, marketing scholars have not widely used social dominance theory with a few notable exceptions (Han et al. 2019; Maxwell-Smith et al. 2020). We contribute to the adoption of social dominance theory within the field of marketing by providing empirical evidence showing that SDO can offer novel insights when examining interactions between groups belonging to distinct racial groups. While we built on the tenets of social dominance theory to examine the impact of racial differences within the context of negotiations, marketing scholars can consider this theory to explain additional marketing phenomena moving forward.

Practical implications

Our findings also have several key practical implications. Managers should be aware that White buyers with a higher SDO might expect Black salespersons to negotiate less than White salespersons. Further, such buyers are also likely to perceive Black salespersons to have negotiated more than they actually have. Firms should explicitly consider this insight when delegating Black salespersons to negotiate contracts and advise them of these pitfalls (especially for contracts that involve intense bargaining). Seller firms should also train their salespersons on the importance of actively managing these buyer perceptions. For example, Black salespersons could be advised to attempt to reduce the duration of the negotiation process to the extent possible (without jeopardizing the outcome), as doing so could possibly attenuate this misperception. Employing a more expeditious negotiation process could be an effective means to mitigate these challenges. However, firms should ultimately ensure that such actions are appropriate for their specific industry and do not inadvertently create a disadvantage for their Black salespersons.

Moreover, seller firms should be cognizant that White buyers with a higher SDO are likely to offer lower rates to Black salespersons and be less inclined to recommend Black salespersons to other prospective buyers (as compared to White salespersons). While seller firms have little control over buyers' levels of SDO or race, they could seek to mitigate this issue by having racially mixed sales teams when negotiating with White buyers. Such measures would particularly be recommended when little is known about the buyers (e.g., new buyers). However, for negotiations with existing buyers (i.e., current customers of the firm) where buyers' levels of SDO have been proven not to impact the negotiation process, such racially mixed sales teams might not be needed.

Discrimination can be conscious or unconscious (Petersen 2006). As such, White buyers with a higher SDO might inadvertently discriminate against Black salespersons if not aware of their own biases. Buyer firms should therefore inform their employees involved in buyer–seller negotiations about the pitfalls associated with buyers high on SDO and its impact on their perceptions and behavior. Buyer firms can video record their buyers' negotiations with salespersons of different races and review those recordings with the buyers to help them gain insights into possible unconscious discriminatory behaviors. Buyer firms can also provide their employees who desire to learn more about the impact of SDO with the measurement scale provided in Table 4 so that they can evaluate their own levels of SDO. Given the sensitivity and divisiveness surrounding racial sensitivity, such training could be optional and offered to those employees requesting it. Studies show that forcing buyers to undergo such training could have an opposite effect, as mandatory diversity training programs can trigger a strong backlash against the very ideas they seek to promote (Dobbin and Kalev 2016). As Rock (2017) argued, "employees need to feel that they're feely choosing to be nonprejudiced, not that they're having it forced upon them".

Limitations and future directions

While our studies offer unique insights into the impact of SDO in the buyer–seller negotiation process, they are not free of limitations. First, we focused on buyers' perceptions of, and behaviors toward, Black salespersons. Future studies should examine the perception of other minorities, such as Hispanics or Asians. Second, we conducted our study in the U.S. Future studies should attempt to replicate our findings in other countries. Third, there are inherent limitations associated with any type of methodological approach, including experimental vignettes. We addressed this limitation by also employing a non-vignette-based experiment in studies 2a and 2b. Future research should employ alternate methods (i.e., grounded theory, case studies) in order to offer richer perspectives into the relationships explored in this research. Specifically, qualitative studies can be extremely helpful in identifying solutions to mitigate racial discrimination. Interviews and case studies with firms that have successfully addressed this issue can offer novel insights. For example, future research could examine whether racially mixed teams could be effective in addressing the issues highlighted here. Fourth, in Study 1 we built our arguments on the premise that White buyers higher on SDO believe that Blacks should settle for less, and thus, expect Black salespersons to negotiate less. Future studies could examine additional mechanisms for the explored

relationships. Doing so would provide additional insights into the processes that lead White buyers with higher SDO to discriminate against Black salespersons and help reduce the issues identified here. Fifth, we conducted our studies in a context where the negotiators acted as agents for their respective organizations. According to agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) and role theory (Solomon et al. 1985), there are behavioral differences between individuals acting as their own agents (e.g., consumers) and individuals acting as agents for others (e.g., purchasing managers). While Hernandez et al. (2019) provided some insights into the impact of racial differences in individual salary negotiations, our findings highlight the need for more research on the impact of racial differences in both situations. In addition, we explored variables from the buyers' perspective (e.g., perceived negotiation likelihood, perceived negotiation intensity). It would be interesting for future studies to explore these from the salespersons' perspective. Lastly, while our research focused on large, multinational corporations, future research could examine these issues in the context of smaller family-owned firms, as the race of the firm owner might impact the results. We hope our findings will raise awareness of the need to explore aspects of racial discrimination that might occur in other areas of marketing.

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-021-00768-0.

Appendix 1

Table 13 Industries included in the studies

Study	Industry
1	Oil and Gas Extraction
1 and 2	General Building Contractors
1 and 2	Food and Kindred Products
2	Textile Mill Products
1 and 2	Apparel and Other Textile Products
2	Lumber and Wood Products
1 and 2	Furniture and Fixtures
1 and 2	Paper and Allied Products
1 and 2	Chemicals and Allied Products
1 and 2	Fabricated Metal Products
1 and 2	Petroleum and Coal Products
1 and 2	Electrical Equipment and Component
1 and 2	Misc. Manufacturing Industries
1 and 2	Transportation Services
1 and 2	Communications
1 and 2	Durable Goods
1 and 2	Non-durable Goods
1 and 2	Food Stores
1 and 2	General Merchandise Stores
1 and 2	Home Furniture
1 and 2	Apparel and Accessory Stores
1 and 2	Hotels, Rooming Houses
1 and 2	Health Services
1 and 2	Non-classifiable Establishments

Appendix 2: Vignettes for Study 1

Imagine you are the buyer manager for your company. Your objective is to purchase the component your firm needs at the lowest price possible as your firm needs 100,000 units. After evaluating different vendors, you decide to purchase the product from JW Group, a large publicly traded multinational corporation and a long-term vendor of your company's. You've also personally interacted with the seller's salesperson before on other business transactions

Over the years of doing business with your firm, JW Group has developed a good reputation by offering competitive prices and good quality products. Below you will find an overview of JW Group's operation and ratings by other buyers in your industry

JW Group has an asking price for this product of $20. Your market research indicates that this is a fair market price, however you decide to offer JW Group's salesperson, Mr. James Smith, $16/unit (20% less than the asking price). Please review the seller's information below, think about this scenario for 2–3 min, then proceed to the next page

	 (Picture used in Scenario 1)	 (Picture used in Scenario 2)
Salesperson	Mr. James Smith*	Mr. James Smith*
Seller name	JW Group	
Asking price per unit (MSRP)	$20	
Seller distance to your facility	1,200 miles	
Average delivery lead time	3 days	
Variability in delivery lead time (SD)	0.5 days	
Product quality rating (1-10 scale)	10 stars	
Delivery reliability rating (1-10 scale)	9.5 stars	
Quality of communication rating (1-10 scale)	9 stars	

*Note: Respondents were presented a vignette containing only one of the two pictures.

References

Åge, L. J., & Eklinder-Frick, J. (2017). Goal-oriented balancing: Happy–happy negotiations beyond win–win situations. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 32*(4), 525–534.

Agndal, H., Åge, L. J., & Eklinder-Frick, J. (2017). Two decades of business negotiation research: An overview and suggestions for future studies. *The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 32*(4), 487–504.

Aiello, A., Passini, S., Tesi, A., Morselli, D., & Pratto, F. (2019). Measuring support for intergroup hierarchies: Assessing the psychometric proprieties of the Italian social dominance orientation 7 scale. *TPM: Testing, Psychometrics, Methodology in Applied Psychology*, *26*(3), 373–383.

Alavi, S., Habel, J., Guenzi, P., & Wieseke, J. (2018). The role of leadership in salespeople's price negotiation behavior. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 46*(4), 703–724.

Alavi, S., Habel, J., Schwenke, M., & Schmitz, C. (2020). Price negotiating for services: Elucidating the ambivalent effects on customers' negotiation aspirations. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 48*(2), 165–185.

Alexander, D. L., Al-Khatib, J. A., Al-Habib, M. I., Bogari, N., & Salamah, N. (2019). Business culture's influence on negotiators' ethical ideologies and judgment: An eight-country study. *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 27*(3), 312–330.

Al-Khatib, J., Rawwas, M. Y., Swaidan, Z., & Rexeisen, R. J. (2005). The ethical challenges of global business-to-business negotiations: An empirical investigation of developing countries' marketing managers. *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 13*(4), 46–60.

Ames, D. R. (2008). Assertiveness expectancies: How hard people push depends on the consequences they predict. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95*(6), 1541–1557.

Anderson, J. (1983). *The architecture of cognition*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Anderson, J., Narus, J., & Narayandas, N. (2009). *Business Market Management: Understanding, Creating and Delivering Value, 3. Auflage*. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice-Hall.

Atefi, Y., Ahearne, M., Hohenberg, S., Hall, Z., & Zettelmeyer, F. (2020). Open negotiation: The back-end benefits of salespeople's transparency in the front end. *Journal of Marketing Research, 57*(6), 1076–1094.

Avery, D. R., Volpone, S. D., & Holmes, I. V. (2018). Racial discrimination in organizations. In A. J. Colella & E. B. King (Eds.), *Oxford library of psychology. The Oxford handbook of workplace discrimination* (pp. 89–109). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baker, T. L., Meyer, T., & Johnson, J. D. (2008). Individual differences in perceptions of service failure and recovery: The role of race and discriminatory bias. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36*(4), 552–564.

Barry, B., & Friedman, R. A. (1998). Bargainer characteristics in distributive and integrative negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*(2), 345–359.

Bennett, A. M., Hill, R. P., & Daddario, K. (2015). Shopping while nonwhite: Racial discrimination among minority consumers. *Journal of Consumer Affairs, 49*(2), 328–355.

Bentler, P. M. (2009). Alpha, dimension-free, and model-based internal consistency reliability. *Psychometrika, 74*(1), 137–143.

Berman, B. (2016). Referral marketing: Harnessing the power of your customers. *Business Horizons, 59*(1), 19–28.

Boles, J. S., Barksdale, H. C., & Johnson, J. T. (1997). Business relationships: An examination of the effects of buyer-salesperson relationships on customer retention and willingness to refer and recommend. *The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 12*(3/4), 253–264.

Brooks, B. W., & Rose, R. L. (2004). A contextual model of negotiation orientation. *Industrial Marketing Management, 33*(2), 125–133.

Burgoon, J. K. (1978). A communication model of personal space violations: Explication and an initial test. *Human Communication Research, 4*(2), 129–142.

Burgoon, J. K. (2015). Expectancy violations theory. *The international encyclopedia of interpersonal communication*, 1–9.

Burgoon, J. K., & Jones, S. B. (1976). Toward a theory of personal space expectations and their violations. *Human Communication Research, 2*(2), 131–146.

Campbell, N. C., Graham, J. L., Jolibert, A., & Meissner, H. G. (1988). Marketing negotiations in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. *Journal of Marketing, 52*(2), 49–62.

Cellich, C., & Jain, S. C. (2016). *Creative solutions to global business negotiations*. Business Expert Press.

Chavan, G. D., Chaudhuri, R., & Johnston, W. J. (2019). Industrial-buying research 1965-2015: Review and analysis. *The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 34*(1), 205–229.

Comer, L. B., Nicholls, J. A. F., & Vermillion, L. J. (1998). Diversity in the sales force: Problems and challenges. *Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 18*(4), 1–20.

Consumer Reports. (2013). *Learning how to bargain can reap big bucks*. https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2013/08/how-to-bargain/index.htm. Accessed 12 December 2020.

Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. *Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24*(4), 349–354.

Data USA. (2018). Data USA: Purchasing managers. Available at: https://datausa.io/profile/soc/113061. Accessed 11.02.2019.

Dearborn, D. C., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Selective perception: A note on the departmental identifications of executives. *Sociometry, 21*(2), 140–144.

DeSante, C. D. (2013). Working twice as hard to get half as far: Race, work ethic, and America's deserving poor. *American Journal of Political Science, 57*(2), 342–356.

Devine, P. G., & Elliot, A. J. (1995). Are racial stereotypes really fading? The Princeton trilogy revisited. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21*(11), 1139–1150.

Dhanani, L. Y., Beus, J. M., & Joseph, D. L. (2018). Workplace discrimination: A meta-analytic extension, critique, and future research agenda. *Personnel Psychology, 71*(2), 147–179.

Dipboye, R. L., & Halverson, S. K. (2004). Subtle (and not so subtle) discrimination in organizations. *The Dark Side of Organizational Behavior, 16*, 131–158.

Dobbin, F. and Kalev, A. (2016). Why diversity programs fail. Available at: https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail. Accessed 10.02.2020.

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. *Academy of Management Review, 14*(1), 57–74.

Elahee, M., & Brooks, C. M. (2004). Trust and negotiation tactics: Perceptions about business-to-business negotiations in Mexico. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 19*(6), 397–404.

Fang, T. (2006). Negotiation: The Chinese style. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 21*(1), 50–60.

Franco, M., Katz, R., Pickens, J., & Brunsma, D. L. (2020). From my own flesh and blood: An exploratory examination of discrimination from family for black/White multiracial people. *Qualitative Social Work, 19*(2), 246–266.

Garcia, R. L., Bergsieker, H. B., & Shelton, J. N. (2017). Racial attitude (dis) similarity and liking in same-race minority interactions. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 20*(4), 501–518.

Gattiker, T. F., Huang, X., & Schwarz, J. L. (2007). Negotiation, email, and internet reverse auctions: How sourcing mechanisms deployed by buyers affect suppliers' trust. *Journal of Operations Management, 25*(1), 184–202.

Geiger, I. (2017). A model of negotiation issue–based tactics in business-to-business sales negotiations. *Industrial Marketing Management, 64*(3), 91–106.

Geiger, I., & Hüffmeier, J. (2020). "The more, the merrier" or "less is more"? How the number of issues addressed in B2B sales negotiations affects dyadic and seller economic outcomes. *Industrial Marketing Management, 87*, 90–105.

Geiger, I., & Laubert, C. (2018). Situational strategic versus personal influences on negotiation medium choice. *International Journal of Conflict Management, 29*(3), 398–423.

Gligor, D. (2020). Birds of a feather: The impact of race on the supplier selection and evaluation process. *International Journal of Production Economics, 230*, 1–13.

Golicic, S. L., Talluri, S., Vickery, S. K., & Narayanan, S. (2008). Optimization models for buyer-supplier negotiations. *International*

Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 38(7), 551–561.

Graf, A., Koeszegi, S. T., & Pesendorfer, E. M. (2012). Cross-cultural negotiations and power distance: Strategies applied by Asian and European buyers and sellers in electronic negotiations. *Nankai Business Review International, 3*(3), 242–256.

Han, K., Jung, J., Mittal, V., Zyung, J. D., & Adam, H. (2019). Political identity and financial risk taking: Insights from social dominance orientation. *Journal of Marketing Research, 56*(4), 581–601.

Hartmann, J., & Moeller, S. (2014). Chain liability in multitier supply chains? Responsibility attributions for unsustainable supplier behavior. *Journal of Operations Management, 32*(5), 281–294.

Harwood, T. G. (2006). Developing buyer-seller relationships through face-to-face negotiations. *Journal of Relationship Marketing, 4*(3–4), 105–122.

Henseler, J., Ringle, C. M., & Sarstedt, M. (2015). A new criterion for assessing discriminant validity in variance-based structural equation modelling. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 43*(1), 115–135.

Herbst, U., Voeth, M., & Meister, C. (2011). What do we know about buyer–seller negotiations in marketing research? A status quo analysis. *Industrial Marketing Management, 40*(6), 967–978.

Hernandez, M., Avery, D. R., Volpone, S. D., & Kaiser, C. R. (2019). Bargaining while black: The role of race in salary negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 104*(4), 581–592.

Hernandez-Arenaz, I., & Iriberri, N. (2019). A review of gender differences in negotiation. In: *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance*, Oxford University Press.

Holmes, Y. M., Beitelspacher, L. S., Hochstein, B., & Bolander, W. (2017). "Let's make a deal:" Price outcomes and the interaction of customer persuasion knowledge and salesperson negotiation strategies. *Journal of Business Research, 78*, 81–92.

Holt, L. F., & Sweitzer, M. D. (2020). More than a black and white issue: Ethnic identity, social dominance orientation, and support for the black lives matter movement. *Self and Identity, 19*(1), 16–31.

Johnson, J. S., & Sohi, R. S. (2016). Understanding and resolving major contractual breaches in buyer–seller relationships: A grounded theory approach. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 44*(2), 185–205.

Jones, E., Moore, J. N., Stanaland, A. J., & Wyatt, R. A. (1998). Salesperson race and gender and the access and legitimacy paradigm: Does difference make a difference? *Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 18*(4), 71–88.

Jones, K. P., Peddie, C. I., Gilrane, V. L., King, E. B., & Gray, A. L. (2016). Not so subtle: A meta-analytic investigation of the correlates of subtle and overt discrimination. *Journal of Management, 42*(6), 1588–1613.

Kappes, C., Häusser, J. A., Mojzisch, A., & Hüffmeier, J. (2020). Age differences in negotiations: Older adults achieve poorer joint outcomes in integrative negotiations. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 149*(11), 2102–2118.

Kaski, T. A., Hautamaki, P., Pullins, E. B., & Kock, H. (2017). Buyer versus salesperson expectations for an initial B2B sales meeting. *The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 32*(1), 46–56.

Kaufmann, L., Rottenburger, J., Carter, C. R., & Schlereth, C. (2018). Bluffs, lies, and consequences: A reconceptualization of bluffing in buyer–supplier negotiations. *Journal of Supply Chain Management, 54*(2), 49–70.

Kemmelmeier, M. (2005). The effects of race and social dominance orientation in simulated juror decision making. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35*(5), 1030–1045.

Kennedy, J. A., Kray, L. J., & Ku, G. (2017). A social-cognitive approach to understanding gender differences in negotiator ethics: The role of moral identity. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 138*, 28–44.

Khakhar, P., & Ahmed, Z. (2017). The concepts of power in international business negotiations: An empirical investigation. *Journal of Transnational Management, 22*(1), 25–52.

Kozicki, S. (2007). Creativity in B2B negotiations: A competitive edge. *Harvard Business Review*, pp. 2–26.

Krishnan, V., Niculescu, M., & Fredericks, E. (2019). Should I choose this salesperson? Buyer's emergent preference in seller from mere exposure. *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 27*(2), 196–209.

Leath, S., Mathews, C., Harrison, A., & Chavous, T. (2019). Racial identity, racial discrimination, and classroom engagement outcomes among black girls and boys in predominantly black and predominantly White school districts. *American Educational Research Journal, 56*(4), 1318–1352.

Lee, K. C., & Kwon, S. J. (2006). The use of cognitive maps and case-based reasoning for B2B negotiation. *Journal of Management Information Systems, 22*(4), 337–376.

Lu, J., Kaufmann, L., & Carter, C. R. (2019). Small talk, big impact–the influence of casual collegial advice on purchasing negotiations. *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 25*(5), 100576.

Malshe, A., Al-Khatib, J. A., & Sailors, J. J. (2010). Business-to-business negotiations: The role of relativism, deceit, and opportunism. *Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing, 17*(2), 173–207.

Martin, C. A. (2005). Racial diversity in professional selling: An empirical investigation of the differences in the perceptions and performance of African-American and Caucasian salespeople. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 20*, 285–296.

Maxwell-Smith, M. A., White, T. B., & Loyd, D. L. (2020). Does perceived treatment of unfamiliar employees affect consumer brand attitudes? Social dominance ideologies reveal who cares the most and why. *Journal of Business Research, 109*, 461–471.

McConahay, J. B. (1983). Modern racism and modern discrimination: The effects of race, racial attitudes, and context on simulated hiring decisions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 9*(4), 551–558.

Mintu-Wimsatt, A., & Gassenheimer, J. B. (1996). Negotiation differences between two diverse cultures. *European Journal of Marketing, 30*(4), 20–39.

Mintu-Wimsatt, A., & Graham, J. L. (2004). Testing a negotiation model on Canadian anglophone and Mexican exporters. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 32*(3), 345–356.

Moosmayer, D. C., Chong, A. Y. L., Liu, M. J., & Schuppar, B. (2013). A neural network approach to predicting price negotiation outcomes in business-to-business contexts. *Expert Systems with Applications, 40*(8), 3028–3035.

Moosmayer, D. C., Niemand, T., & Siems, F. U. (2016). Ethical reasoning in business-to-business negotiations: Evidence from relationships in the chemical industry in Germany. *Business Ethics: A European Review, 25*(2), 128–143.

Murphy, M., & Sashi, C. M. (2018). Communication, interactivity, and satisfaction in B2B relationships. *Industrial Marketing Management, 68*, 1–12.

Ouellet, J. F. (2007). Consumer racism and its effects on domestic cross-ethnic product purchase: An empirical test in the United States, Canada, and France. *Journal of Marketing, 71*(1), 113–128.

Patton, C., & Balakrishnan, P. S. (2012). Negotiating when outnumbered: Agenda strategies for bargaining with buying teams. *International Journal of Research in Marketing, 29*(3), 280–291.

Pawar, P. V., Abhishek, B., & Aital, P. (2017). Systematic literature review on electronic reverse auction: Issues and research discussion. *International Journal of Procurement Management, 10*, 290–310.

Petersen, T. (2006). Motive and cognition: Conscious and unconscious processes in employment discrimination. In J. Elster, O. Gjelsvik, A. Hylland, & K. Moene (Eds.), *Understanding choice, explaining behaviour: Essays in honour of ole-Jorgen Skog* (pp. 225–248). Oslo: Oslo Academic Press.

Pittman, C. (2020). "Shopping while black": Black consumers' management of racial stigma and racial profiling in retail settings. *Journal of Consumer Culture, 20*(1), 3–22.

Plous, S., & Williams, T. (1995). Racial stereotypes from the days of American slavery: A continuing legacy. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25*(9), 795–817.

Posthuma, R. A., & Campion, M. A. (2009). Age stereotypes in the workplace: Common stereotypes, moderators, and future research directions. *Journal of Management, 35*(1), 158–188.

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*(4), 741–763.

Pullins, E. B., Haugtvedt, C. P., Dickson, P. R., Fine, L. M., & Lewicki, R. J. (2000). Individual differences in intrinsic motivation and the use of cooperative negotiation tactics. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 15*(7), 466–478.

Rahman, S. K., Sathik, M. M., & Kannan, K. S. (2012). Multiple linear regression models in outlier detection. *International Journal of Research in Computer Science, 2*(2), 23–28.

Reimann, F., Shen, P., & Kaufmann, L. (2016). Effectiveness of power use in buyer-supplier negotiations: The moderating role of negotiator agreeableness. *International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 46*(10), 932–952.

Ribbink, D., & Grimm, C. M. (2014). The impact of cultural differences on buyer–supplier negotiations: An experimental study. *Journal of Operations Management, 32*(3), 114–126.

Rock, D. (2017). Is your company's diversity training making you more biased? Available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/your-brain-work/201706/is-your-company-s-diversity-training-making-you-more-biased. Accessed 10.02.2020.

Rogers, H., & Fells, R. (2017). Successful buyer–supplier relationships: The role of negotiations. *Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation, 3*(3), 121–136.

Rottenburger, J. R., & Kaufmann, L. (2020). Picking on the new kid: Firm newness and deception in buyer–supplier negotiations. *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 26*(1), 100527.

Rottenburger, J. R., Carter, C. R., & Kaufmann, L. (2019). It's alright, it's just a bluff: Why do corporate codes reduce lying, but not bluffing? *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 25*(1), 30–39.

Rubin, M., & Hewstone, M. (2004). Social identity, system justification, and social dominance: Commentary on Reicher, Jost et al., and Sidanius et al. *Political Psychology, 25*(6), 823–844.

Schoenherr, T., & Mabert, V. A. (2011). A comparison of online and offline procurement in B2B markets: Results from a large-scale survey. *International Journal of Production Research, 49*(3), 827–846.

Schoop, M., Köhne, F., Staskiewicz, D., Voeth, M., & Herbst, U. (2008). The antecedents of renegotiations in practice—An exploratory analysis. *Group Decision and Negotiation, 17*(2), 127–139.

Schreer, G. E., Smith, S., & Thomas, K. (2009). "Shopping while black": Examining racial discrimination in a retail setting 1. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39*(6), 1432–1444.

Schulze-Horn, I., Hueren, S., Scheffler, P., & Schiele, H. (2020). Artificial intelligence in purchasing: Facilitating mechanism design-based negotiations. *Applied Artificial Intelligence, 34*(8), 618–642.

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (2004). Social dominance theory: A new synthesis. In J. T. Jost & J. Sidanius (Eds.), *Key readings in social psychology. Political psychology: Key readings* (pp. 315–332). New York: Psychology Press.

Sidanius, J., Levin, S., Liu, J., & Pratto, F. (2000). Social dominance orientation, anti-egalitarianism and the political psychology of gender: An extension and cross-cultural replication. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 30*(1), 41–67.

Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Van Laar, C., & Levin, S. (2004). Social dominance theory: Its agenda and method. *Political Psychology, 25*(6), 845–880.

Sigurðardóttir, A. G., Ujwary-Gil, A., & Candi, M. (2018). B2B negotiation tactics in creative sectors. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 33*(4), 429–441.

Sigurðardóttir, A. G., Hotait, A., & Eichstädt, T. (2019). Buyer and seller differences in Business-to-Business negotiations. *Negotiation Journal, 35*(2), 297–331.

Simkova, N., & Smutny, Z. (2019). Comparison of unassisted and smart assisted negotiation in B2B relationships from the perspective of generation Y. *Information, 10*(8), 263.

Singh, S. K., Marinova, D., & Singh, J. (2020). Business-to-Business E-negotiations and influence tactics. *Journal of Marketing, 84*(2), 47–68.

Sinha, J., & Bagchi, R. (2019). Role of ambient temperature in influencing willingness to pay in auctions and negotiations. *Journal of Marketing, 83*(4), 121–138.

Sokolinskiy, O., Sopranzetti, B., Rogers, D. S., & Leuschner, R. (2019). Inventory management and endogenous demand: Investigating the role of customer referrals, defections, and product market failure. *Decision Sciences, 50*(1), 118–141.

Solomon, M. R., Surprenant, C., Czepiel, J. A., & Gutman, E. G. (1985). A role theory perspective on dyadic interactions: The service encounter. *Journal of Marketing, 49*(1), 99–111.

Steiner, M., Eggert, A., Ulaga, W., & Backhaus, K. (2016). Do customized service packages impede value capture in industrial markets? *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 44*(2), 151–165.

Stewart, A. L., & Tran, J. (2018). Protesting racial hierarchy: Testing a social dominance theory model of collective action among white Americans. *Journal of Social Issues, 74*(2), 299–316.

Stuhlmacher, A. F., & Walters, A. E. (1999). Gender differences in negotiation outcome: A meta-analysis. *Personnel Psychology, 52*(3), 653–677.

Ta, H., Esper, T. L., & Hofer, A. R. (2018). Designing crowdsourced delivery systems: The effect of driver disclosure and ethnic similarity. *Journal of Operations Management, 60*(1), 19–33.

Taylor, C. R., Franke, G. R., & Bang, H. K. (2006). Use and effectiveness of billboards: Perspectives from selective-perception theory and retail-gravity models. *Journal of Advertising, 35*(4), 21–34.

Tesi, A., Pratto, F., Pierro, A., & Aiello, A. (2020). Group dominance in hierarchy-attenuating and hierarchy-enhancing organizations: The role of social dominance orientation, need for cognitive closure, and power tactics in a person–environment (mis) fit perspective. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 24*(2), 102–114.

Thompson, L. L., Wang, J., & Gunia, B. C. (2010). Negotiation. *Annual Review of Psychology, 61*, 491–515.

Triana, M. D. C., Jayasinghe, M., & Pieper, J. R. (2015). Perceived workplace racial discrimination and its correlates: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 36*(4), 491–513.

Upshaw, H. S. (1962). Own attitude as an anchor in equal-appearing intervals. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 64*(2), 85–96.

Van Den Bulte, C., Bayer, E., Skiera, B., & Schmitt, P. (2018). How customer referral programs turn social capital into economic capital. *Journal of Marketing Research, 55*(1), 132–146.

Wilken, R., Jacob, F., & Prime, N. (2013). The ambiguous role of cultural moderators in intercultural business negotiations. *International Business Review, 22*(4), 736–753.

Wu, L. Y., Chen, P. Y., & Chen, K. Y. (2015). Why does loyalty–cooperation behavior vary over buyer–seller relationship? *Journal of Business Research, 68*(11), 2322–2329.

Yang, Y., Tang, C., Qu, X., Wang, C., & Denson, T. F. (2018). Group facial width-to-height ratio predicts intergroup negotiation outcomes. *Frontiers in Psychology, 9*, 214.

Publisher's note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.